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Politicising the World Bank’s over-institutionalised 
water reforms in the developing countries
S. Wong, UK
This paper challenges the World Bank’s sustainable water management framework. Drawing upon case 
studies in the developing world, this paper demonstrates how to build a more socially-informed model by 
incorporating human values into water governance and seeking a deeper understanding of social context 
and cultural diversity. This paper highlights the need to achieve water sustainability without undermining the 
social networks and livelihoods of poor people. Successful water interventions depend on our understanding 
of: (1) history and culture of social relations; (2) existing cooperative relations that shape water participa-
tion; (3) people’s livelihood priorities; (4) individuals’ preferred institutional environment; (5) the interplay 
between new and old institutions through which people get access to resources and exercise agency.
Introduction
This paper focuses on the impact of the World Bank’s sustainable water management framework (hereafter 
called the ‘Water framework’) on the livelihoods and social networks of poor people in the developing 
countries. It examines whether social equity and poverty reduction are compromised in the name of water 
efficiency. It also interrogates the Water Framework by exploring its underlying assumptions on human 
incentives and water use and examines its understanding of institutions in shaping human actions.
from the ‘Water resources Management policy paper’ (1993) to the recent ‘Water resources Sector 
Strategy’ (2004), the World Bank has gone to great lengths to get water management right. It proposed the 
Water framework which has widely been applied in many poor countries. The Water framework comprises 
a package of widely diffused policy prescriptions: community participation, decentralisation, cost recov-
ery, good governance, strict enforcement and monitoring and appropriate use of technology. The Water 
Framework has been highly influential at theoretical and policy levels and in the developing and developed 
world. The United Nations development programme, OeCd, european Union and the International Water 
association have applied similar guiding principles (OeCd, 2004; eU, 2000). The Water framework has 
far-reaching policy implications too. It recognises the pre-conditions for improving water resources, such as 
economic and political reforms. It acknowledges the role of ‘private-public’ synergy in water governance. 
Most importantly, it highlights the social dimensions of water planning by recognising the role of cultural 
norms and social relations in aligning private and collective interests.
despite its high popularity, the Water framework has strongly been challenged. Critics argue that the 
universal application of the Water framework fails to embrace the diversity and complexity of cultural 
characteristics of water use and distribution in different countries. Defining water as a purely economic 
commodity has caused controversy since this neglects another important side: that of water as a community 
asset (Strang, 2004). political issues, such as access to, and distribution of, water, are not properly addressed 
(Mehta, 2003). It is also criticised for an insufficient gender analysis of the competing use of water in com-
munities (Vernooy and fajber, 2006). The functional approach to institutions, crafting institutions to ‘achieve 
joint gains through cooperation and exchange’ (Thelen, 2003:214), is accused of playing down the messy 
processes of institutional building (Mehta et al. 1999).
I intend to build on these critiques in two aspects: firstly, I criticise the Water Framework for focusing 
narrowly on economic rationality without considering a wider range of social factors and cultural contexts. 
Secondly, I highlight the ‘clumsy’ processes and unintended consequences of institutional crafting by illustrat-
ing with examples how socially-embedded institutions interact with judicial and bureaucratic institutions. I 
argue that the universal application of the design principles, such as clearly-defined water boundaries, strict 
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rule enforcement and the use of sanctions, can undermine existing relations of cooperation.
This paper draws largely upon the common-pool resources management literature in the developing world 
context. I develop my arguments based on the concept of social embeddedness by Cleaver (2002). The concept 
helps to explore everyday social interactions which link individual agency and social structure. It is used as 
a sociological lens to consider how water is accessed and distributed. This paper begins by introducing the 
guiding principles of the Water framework. By using the notion of social embeddedness, it then examines 
three types of institutions and analyses the impact of clearly-defined boundaries, strict rule enforcement 
and use of sanctions. It concludes by explaining how a more socially-informed water framework helps poor 
people to secure more stable livelihoods.
Sustainable water management framework
The Water framework stresses the importance of co-management. Stakeholder participation represents a 
bottom-up approach in that community members are encouraged to participate in water management and 
decision-making. The aim of participation is to ‘influence policy formulation, alternative designs, invest-
ment choices and management decisions affecting their communities’ (World Bank, 1993:4). By informa-
tion sharing, increasing transparency and open communication, different stakeholders feel the ownership 
of, and share the responsibility for, water management. This then improves incentives for cost recovery and 
service quality.
a decentralised approach to water regulation transfers the major responsibility, service delivery and 
power from central government to local governments, private sector and community organisations, such 
as water user associations (World Bank, 1993). assertions are made that centralised practice involves high 
administrative costs and results in low efficiency. The World Bank suggests that: ‘experience demonstrates 
that decentralized service delivery can break the vicious cycle whereby service level declines’ (quoted in 
dinar, 1998:371).
Calls for deregulation and privatisation are another essential part of the water reforms. deregulation re-
defines water ownership and leads to a reduction of government control in water governance. It is claimed 
that implementing privatisation by selling previously state-owned water enterprises to private investors brings 
competition, and therefore better services. a new water pricing system and the principle of full recovery of 
the costs of water services are considered to provide adequate incentives for efficient use of water (Kallis 
and Bulter, 2001). 
effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are also central to the framework. They lay down 
clear rules about what water-using behaviour is desirable. Sanctions are applied to ‘bad apples’ who fail to 
comply with the regulations. The role of technology in the framework is different from older practice. While 
technical knowledge and water-saving innovations remain critical in providing reliable water delivery, more 
emphasis is placed on minimising the negative environmental impact caused by technologies.
Social embeddedness of institutions
How well can the Water framework, established with a strong focus on representation, transparency, regulation 
and rights, achieve ecological sustainability and economic viability, without undermining social networks 
and livelihoods of the poor? In this paper, drawing upon the theoretical work of frances Cleaver (2005), 
the concept of social embeddedness is used to examine if, and how, water rights and governance are shaped 
by social precedents, human relations, social livelihoods and individual preferences. Cleaver (2005) links 
the concept of social embeddedness directly to water governance. She argues that agents are embedded in 
social norms and structures which facilitate and constrain their agency and the processes of decision-making. 
She places social interactions within a particular historical, cultural and spatial context, and underlines the 
ongoing and multi-faceted nature of social livelihoods of the poor. In her research in the african context, 
she is keen to show that the process of decision-making is complex and dynamic, and that motivations are 
mixed and diverse. She emphasises the processes by which people consciously and unconsciously draw upon 
existing social and cultural arrangements to make decisions. She also examines how the mechanisms for 
collective action are ‘borrowed or constructed from existing institutions, styles of thinking and sanctioned 
social relationships’ (Cleaver, 2001:29).
Complexity of institutions
Institutions, from the neo-institutional perspective, are not simply regulations or organisations, but ‘the 
set of rules governing water development use’ (World Bank, 1994:31). Institutions create incentives and 
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disincentives for people to work together. Therefore, the focus has shifted from the constraining nature of 
institutions to the enabling role in shaping human action (Ostrom, 1992).
There are three forms of institutions: judicial, bureaucratic and socially-embedded. Judicial institutions 
comprise the law and regulations which determine water ownership and the structure of authority. Clear sets 
of rights and responsibilities are laid down, so that both water and sewage providers and water users know 
what is expected of them (el-fadel, et al. 2001). Sanctions, such as threatening to cut water supply, are 
used to deter free-riding behaviour and to ensure water efficiency. Bureaucratic institutions are defined as 
‘formalised arrangements based on explicit organisational structures [and] contracts ……. often introduced 
by governments or development agencies’ (Cleaver, 2002:13). They are manifest in the codification of rules 
and the specification of clear authority structures. Socially-embedded institutions are social values and norms 
which govern and shape patterns of social interactions and water-use behaviour. They are based on culture, 
social organisations and daily practices.
The assumption of ‘institutional crafting’ in the Water framework lies in the desirability and possibility of 
replacing existing ineffective institutions with new ones for specific purposes. Forming water users’ groups, 
setting up water tariffs and using water permits are a few examples of institutions used to shape specific 
types of interactions and cooperation in order to achieve rapid and visible results. although neo-institutional 
scholars stress the need to design institutions to suit local circumstances, they tend to assume that institutions 
are relatively predictable, stable and continuous.
Institutions, however, are more diverse and complex than the neo-institutional perspective suggests. for 
example, in their study in Tanzania, Cleaver and frank (2005) challenge the single-purpose, manipulative 
and narrow view of institutions by exploring the diversity of institutional forms. They find that under the 
name Sungusungu, the group does not perform only a fixed function, but helps to search for lost children 
and disseminate messages around the village, organise camps of desperate young men and initiate other 
collective works.
While some institutions exhibit higher stability, others are more ad hoc, intermittent and fragile. In their 
case study of canal irrigation systems in India, Meinzen-dick et al. (2002) suggest that relations of coopera-
tion, such as canal cleaning and repair, happen spontaneously at certain periods of the seasons. They also 
report on several occasions that farmers organise agitations and demonstrations to press their demands and 
the trips are funded by a voluntary collection from the farmers. These examples demonstrate that collec-
tive action can be ignited by a single few incidents, arranged on an ad hoc basis, and then die away when 
circumstances change.
The dynamic and fractured nature of institutions and the unintended consequences of institutional building 
pose a challenge to institutional design. Mehta et al. (1999) argue that acknowledging the limitations of our 
ability to craft institutions is the first step in achieving sustainable resource management. They advocate 
a high degree of institutional flexibility by adopting a ‘mix and match’ approach to combine modern and 
traditional institutions. In their investigation on the Gal Oya irrigation scheme in Sri Lanka, Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna (2000) also demonstrate the flexible design of institutions by highlighting that farmers aban-
don rice farming and switch to plant other crops that require less water and are better able to survive when 
facing water stress.
Clearly defined boundaries: Rigid or permeable?
Ostrom (1992) suggests that resources should be managed within clearly-defined boundaries, and users’ 
rights over the resources must be clearly specified. The idea is based on an assumption that the collective 
action dilemma is caused by the scale of natural resources and open access to them (faO, 1999). Unclear 
ownership and the failure to exclude other users creates inevitable difficulties involved in monitoring the 
use of the natural resources, and ‘balancing one use against another, make exclusion or restrictions on access 
intrinsically problematic’ (Gibson et al.,1998: para15).
Clarity, security and exclusivity of property rights arrangements is also intended to provide incentives for 
local residents to use water sustainably and to minimise conflicts since:
 ‘…… clear boundaries may help individuals overcome the rule-making, collective action problem by 
increasing their ability to calculate an expected flow of benefits by knowing what and who are involved in 
decision making’ (Gilson, et al. 2005: para43).
In other words, well-defined boundaries are expected to reduce uncertainty about who benefits and who 
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pays the cost, and determine who has the rights to access conservation resources within a given area. for 
example, in Ceara, Northeast Brazil, Lemos and de Oliveira (2004) advocate the enforcement of water 
rights by issuing water permits. In the case study of India, water user groups must declare clearly the size of 
river basin in their control and be registered by local government. all these attempts are expected to sustain 
collective action and reduce the uncontrolled use of water.
The call for clear boundaries, however, has led to concern about whether the complex social arrangements 
and livelihood networks of different water users and whether these are adequately considered. ‘Modern’ 
boundaries do not necessarily match either ‘traditional’ village boundaries or biophysical ones. Campell et 
al. (2001) explain that:
‘…… Boundaries are generally porous, and open to individual interpretation and contestation, and are 
changeable. In general, it is very difficult to see how boundaries can become more clearly defined. Any 
attempts to harden the boundaries are likely to be frustrated by local people or user groups’ (p594-5).
The permeable and fluctuating nature of boundaries allows people to draw on a variety of institutional 
channels to legitimise their access to resources, and to utilise multiple social networks and both ‘traditional’ 
and ‘modern’ institutions to make claims and secure access and rights. Rigid boundaries and specifications 
risk constraining negotiation and compromise between individuals (Cleaver, 2002). Using the Western India 
rain-fed farming project as an example, Tod et al. (2003) draw our attention to the complementary relationship 
amongst pastoralists, farmers and hunters. Living in arid areas, they share water for various purposes, such 
as irrigation, domestic use and livestock. There are concerns that these mutually-beneficial arrangements are 
not compatible with the demarcation of ‘artificial’ administrative water boundaries. Worse still, the existing 
patterns of reciprocity amongst villages may be undermined. The seasonality of rural livelihoods and the 
differing needs for access to water over the year also need to be taken into account. establishing a clear 
boundary therefore may fail to accommodate multiple interests in forest use. restricting some user groups 
in their access to water can easily create friction and conflicts. In their observations in India, Ballabh et al. 
(2002) report that confusion and disputes among villages arise because new demarcations exclude some 
villages which previously shared the resources.
Redefining and re-mapping administrative, social and resource boundaries needs extra attention, especially 
to the nature of people’s existing living arrangements and patterns. Resource access is a fluid and negotiable 
process. The diverse types of property and use right, Leach and fairhead (2001) argue, ‘frequently co-exist 
and [are] legitimised by different institutions’ (p229). Organisation of people’s lives is shaped and reshaped 
by multiple social and cultural networks, rather than simply by resource or jurisdictional boundaries. Clear 
demarcation of water boundaries can undermine institutional flexibility and worsen the ties between differ-
ent water users.
Undesirability of strict rule enforcement and sanctions
Well-established rules to allocate and distribute water, clearly-assigned roles to organise collective action 
for operation and maintenance, and consistent monitoring of water users’ behaviour are considered as a 
necessary condition for the establishment of effective water management. This is clearly stated in the World 
Bank water strategic report: ‘The enforcement of water legislation and policies depends on the relevance 
of the regulations and on the administrative machinery required to ensure compliance’ (1994:33). rule 
enforcement is expected to evoke cooperative effort because ‘people expect that this is how things should 
and will work in that community’ (Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000:1877).
It is, however, not clear whether rules and roles can be externally imposed. Neither is it certain how 
uniform rule enforcement fits with the needs of different water users. Women, for example, have specific 
needs with respect to water and they have different water preferences from men. In order to cope with the 
demands of domestic consumption and productive use of water, women express ‘a clear preference for ir-
rigation at specific times of the day when they are not busy with other tasks such as cooking’ (Zwarteveen, 
1997:1338). rule-based procedures on a non-discretionary basis may require individuals facing different 
social circumstances to bend the rules to obtain minimal access to water. Widows, wives of migrated men and 
the disabled, for example, may not have formal entitlements to land and water, but they might have informal 
means and can use their social networks to obtain the right amount of water at the right time. In the Chhattis 
Mauja irrigation system in Nepal, Zwarteveen (1997) shows that poor women who steal water at night are 
not punished by the water committees because they have good relations with the committee members. This 
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example is not an attempt to exaggerate the room for manoeuvre of the powerless, but to draw attention to 
the downside and inflexibility of rule enforcement in restricting informal access of the needy.
Formal conflict resolution mechanisms, such as court and arbitration groups, are favoured in settling disputes 
over the use of water and to enforce generally-agreed decisions. Such external intervention in establishing 
new patterns of authority, however, pays insufficient attention to existing informal rules that may already be 
in practice. The new, ‘modern’ structures of authority do not supersede, but work along with, the existing, 
‘customary’ institutional arrangements. These dual systems are not uncommon in jurisdiction over the use 
of natural resources in most developing countries. Traditional chieftainship, headmen, spiritual mediums, 
healers and guardians of shrines still play an important role in matters of land allocation, access to forest 
and resource disputes (Cleaver and frank, 2005). Villagers may also prefer to solve disputes outside the 
formal institutions since this ‘saves them the hassle of writing letters and making presentations in public’ 
(Zwarteveen, 1997:1343). In the Gal Oya irrigation scheme in Sri Lanka, Uphoff and Wijayaratna (2000) find 
that villagers opt for the elders to mediate. Such indigenous customs and authorities, sometimes providing 
flexibility for the poor to secure access to water, should not be ignored.
Sanctions play a key role in institutional governance. While the role of informal social sanctions is ac-
knowledged, economic institutionalists tend to prefer specific punishments and strict penalisation imposed on 
those who do not keep contracts. The World Bank is in favour of ‘enforcing sanctions using fines and other 
penalties for non-compliance’ (1994:77). The emphasis on sanctions in securing compliance has, however, 
been questioned. My research suggests that consensual ruling, rather than strict penalisation, is the accept-
able social norm in collective governance. Sanctions are rarely imposed in real life, and power lies in their 
threat rather than their activation (Wong, 2005). Using informal social pressure, rather than punishment, is 
a more common strategy. On some occasions, households with financial problems are exempted from pay-
ing contributions. In addition, disputes are discussed and settled outside formal institutions, and outcomes 
hinge largely on relations among kin, neighbours and group members. Since most community members and 
leaders are local members, and their families know one another very well. These dense networks blur the 
distinction between private and public lives. as platteau and abraham (2002) suggest: ‘any disagreement 
among the elite about a rule or a decision is bound to spill over into the sphere of private relations’ (p112). 
The tight intertwining of the private and social spheres means that ‘any open manifestation of disagreement at 
the level of community affairs creates a negative externality on the level of interpersonal relations’ (p118). 
Exclusive and repressive institutions
While old institutions can be exclusive and repressive, the introduction of new bureaucratic institutions or 
organisational arrangements is not necessarily inclusive or emancipatory. One of the best examples is the 
role of children and young people in water management. In Usangu, they play an influential role in water 
resource use and management through practice. They make decisions and negotiate with their families about 
water collection and usage, livestock welfare and farming practices (Cleaver, 2002). When bureaucratic 
management structures are formed, however, they are not included. There is a risk that the effectiveness of 
the reforms is constrained because the voices of the children are completely ignored.
On the contrary, gender inclusion and women participation have a high profile within the Water Framework. 
Women are considered as managers of water, and their involvement in user organisations ‘is instrumental in 
the success and in the sustainability of water supply and sanitation projects’ (World Bank, 1994:36). Women 
are encouraged to have representatives in the water users groups or committees to influence the decision-
making processes that affect their lives. despite the increasing visibility of women, including women in water 
governance may not necessarily suit women’s strategic needs or challenge gender-biased norms. Zwarteveen 
(1997) argues that water user groups in general remain male social clubs, predominately involved with their 
traditional activities. While women may feel able to participate in meetings to discuss resource management 
at hamlet level, they do not feel able to speak out or take the lead in public since they do not have the ‘right’ 
use of language and knowledge. This psychological inefficacy, deeply embedded in local tradition, she cau-
tions, cannot be resolved simply by putting women in public meetings and committees.
Conclusions and policy implementations
This paper has highlighted the shortcomings of the Water framework in its underlying ‘strong emphasis on 
the primacy of the economic over social and environmental principles in water resources use’ (Lemos and 
de Oliveira, 2004:2132). Water reforms, guided by strict rule enforcement, clearly-defined boundaries and 
the use of sanctions, risk destroying the stable livelihoods of the poor, eroding already-limited social capital, 
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undermining established patterns of water sharing and making access to water more difficult. This, ironically, 
contradicts the Bank’s intention of reducing poverty by effective water interventions. The problems of the 
Water framework lie in its inadequate understanding of institutions. The neo-institutional assumption of 
human rationality as necessarily selfish and opportunistic does not pay enough attention to a wider and more 
complex motivations involved in the process of negotiating water ownership. Its faith in formal institutions 
and the utilitarian view of them also fails to consider the ad hoc, intermittent and unpredictable aspects. as 
Berry (1993) argues, ‘interventions served to create additional channels of institutional membership and 
access to resources, which were superimposed on existing ones rather than superseding them’ (p210).
The reviving interests about the role of community are a response to the failure of the market and the 
state alone in achieving effective resource management. However, communities are not independent of the 
market or the state. They need external assistance from the state and the market to provide financial and 
technological support and to resolve inter-community disputes. The call for synergy, therefore, becomes 
popular in the common-pool resource management literature because it, as paavola and adger (2005) suggest, 
‘combines local relative advantages with the relative advantages of the state [and market] in the environment 
governance’ (p358). This ‘win-win’ situation, nevertheless, needs close scrutiny. The co-management may 
be achieved in unfavourable terms for local communities. The state and the market may assist local elites to 
capture social capital and turn them into political capital for their own good. In addition, water interventions 
do not stand apart from human values and social contexts. There is a need to put a more human face on 
water reforms and designs. In order to achieve effective water reforms, I suggest that our understanding of 
these five social contexts are particularly important: (1) history and culture of social relations; (2) existing 
relations of cooperation that shape water participation; (3) individuals’ preferred institutional environment; 
(4) people’s livelihood priorities; and (5) the contextual knowledge of both formal and informal channels 
through which people obtain access to resources and exercise agency.
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